This paper reports on the origins of "scheme liability" doctrine and on its fall under the Supreme Court decision in Stoneridge. It discusses also the "nonspeaking actor" issue that has arisen as a result, and outlines the comparative law perspective and the European regulatory policy.
Securities issuer is charged with specific duties to disclose and inform investors in securities markets. Those duties can be violated by him through deceptive practices and fraudulent schemes elaborated and/or implemented in cooperation with third parties ( "secondary actors" like auditors, investment banks, lawyers, commercial partners). Some kind of secondary actors can act openly with public declarations or counseling (for example auditors), some others behave silently: for example by aiding the issuer to misrepresent transactions 1 . This latter behavior turns often into severe economic losses to shareholders. Who bears such losses? There is a high probability that shareholders will file a suit against issuer or auditors that directly carry on the disclosure process reaching huge settlements. However it results in setting free from any liability those who assist the issuer without making any public statement. 
(2008)
, "the respondents (Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc) were suppliers and also became later customers of Charter Communications, Inc. a publicly traded company. In late 2000 the executives of Charter realized that the company would miss the projected revenue and cash flow. In order to meet the expectations Charter and the respondents arranged an overpayment for the products of the respondents with the understanding that the respondents would return the overpayment by purchasing advertising from Charter for a price higher than fair value. Although the transaction had no economic substance it enabled Charter to improve its financial statements by recording the advertising purchases as revenue and capitalizing the purchase of the overpaid products. The documents of the transactions were drafted in way that they appeared as being unrelated and conducted in an ordinary way of business. Especially the new agreement concerning the purchase of the products of the respondent were backdated so that they appeared of being negotiated one month before the advertisement agreement." See M.C. HILGARD This paper investigates the liability of "non-speaking actors" for issuer misrepresentation in a comparative perspective. Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 furthers the purpose of "full disclosure" by prohibiting the use or employment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the SEC may prescribe 2 . SEC Rule 10b-5 and its three subsections effectuate this mandate 3 . Specifically, Rule 10b-5(b) bars incorrect and incomplete disclosure by imposing a duty on speakers to be truthful and complete-it prohibits "any untrue statement of material fact" or omission "to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading." 4 Rules 10b-5(a) & (c), in contrast, address conduct that does not involve speaking, and thus apply even where there is no disclosure. They prohibit "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" and "any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. Litigation Reform Act (the "PSLRA") which would restore aiding and abetting liability. Ultimately, Congress concluded that only the SEC -which, unlike private plaintiffs, does not possess a profit motive and is charged with considering the market impact of its actions -should have the right to bring claims against those who aid and abet securities fraud. 6 This is called also secondary liability to distinguish it from primary liability as the only one allowing a private right to sue 7 . "Scheme liability" doctrine predicates a broad expansion of primary liability under Section 10(b) 8 . Under the "participation test", anyone who takes part in a transaction that has the "purpose and effect" of creating "a false appearance of material fact in furtherance of [a] scheme" can be held jointly and severally liable 9 . "Any person who directly or indirectly engages in a manipulative or deceptive act as part of a scheme to defraud can be a primary violator of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; any person who provides assistance to other participants in a scheme but does not himself engage in a manipulative or deceptive act can only be an aider and abettor."
10
According to the « participation test » secondary actors must give substantial assistance to issuer and must act with strong inference of scienter to be held liable 11 . 6 Brief of Organization for International Investment, at 4. 7 See for a critical approach, R.A. PRENTICE, Locating That "Indistinct" and "Virtually
The same goal is achieved by a similar test when the participant is proved not to be an innocent victim of issuer machination but conscious creator of misrepresentation himself (as the « creator of misrepresentation test »). An intensive discussion started in 2008 about "scheme liability" which brought the "Stoneridge case" to the U.S. Supreme Court
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. The decision, a negative response 13 , is considered extremely relevant because of its systemic impact on the global economy and its influence on the future behavior of many commercial actors and institutional investors. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008) held that liability even for 11 If an investment bank engages in the creation of a sham entity as part of the services to arrange the financing, the investment bank may be a primary violator if it acted with scienter. The investment bank itself engaged in a deceptive act. If a third party engages with the corporation in a transaction whose principal purpose and effect is to create a false appearance of revenues, intending to deceive investors in the corporation's stock, it may be a primary violator. because it fails to account for the gains of equally innocent shareholders who sold at the inflated price 16 . Although this kind of cost-benefit analysis is fashionable, the same reasons could be adopted for questioning the liability of the primary violator. This approach could lead to an aggravation of the actual financial crisis. It doesn't take into account that an extension of liability to "non-speaking actors" could drive beneficial effects on transaction costs allocation. Above all it makes clear that courts often act as economic policy makers. Economic analysis of law must take very seriously the decline of the "new economy" model and the recent fall of the reputation of securities markets. As underlined by Prof. Coffe, there is no stronger case for judicial recognition of an implied cause of action than when a statute declares a wrong. Aiding and abetting a fraud has been a crime for 100 years.
U.S.C. § 2 (Principals) declares:"(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal"
That substantial aid to a fraudulent scheme is actionable has been declared « In hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5. »
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Recognition of a private cause of action in tort is an elementary proposition. It is followed by the Restatement of Torts (2d) which declares, in § 876 (b) that an actor is liable for harm resulting to a third person as a result of the tortious conduct of another 16 
Political economy argument.
The practical effect of "scheme liability" would be that any company that enters into a general commercial transaction could be held liable to a counterparty's shareholders under Section 10(b) if its counterparty misreports the transaction on its own financial statements. This result would obtain even though the "non-speaking" company correctly accounted for the transaction in its own financial statements and neither made representations nor owed any duties to the counterparty's shareholders. "Scheme liability" could expose those who engage in commercial transactions with U.S. issuers to liability for the issuer's misrepresentations. It also increases the likelihood that the silent counterparty could be held jointly and severally liable for schemewide damages. This change could turn into a hostile U.S. litigation environment that will deter foreign companies from doing business with U.S. companies. "scheme liability" differs widely from strict liability as in the first plaintiffs have to comply with burdensome allegations advisor to the CEO counseled fraud or illegality; rather, the plaintiff must plead such a claim with particularity before it can obtain any discovery. This is one of the primary reasons that credit rating agencies have never been held liable for securities fraud." See Testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, at 8. On credit rating agencies liability see, R. VON SCHWEINITZ, Rating Agencies. Their Business, Regulation and Liability, commercial partners of a misreprentative issuer could be drawn in hostile litigation environment, but only those who sciently participate in a deceptive scheme. The market's ability to avoid information asymmetries due to moral hazard is a long-term issue and the legal issues goal is to prevent a short-term systemic impact through deterrence. Financial crisis critics have already demonstrated how much legal issues can be affected by some political-economic doctrines 21 .
Bright line test (reliance).
According to the "bright line test" the extension of private right of action to aiders and abettors falls on the plaintiff's reliance upon a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant. Supporting a highly formalistic reasoning the S.C. applies the "bright line test" excluding "scheme liability". In § 10b-5 "antifraud provision", reliance is presumed in two circumstances (as a "rebuttable presumption"). First, if there is an omission of a material fact by one who owns a duty to disclose. Nonspeaking-actors have no duty to disclose but only a general duty to not aid and abet violations of such duty. Second, under the "fraud-on-the-market" doctrine, reliance is presumed when the statements at issue become public. In Basic Inc. 22 , the S.C held that the "fraud-on-the-market" theory provides adequate support for a presumption in private securities actions that shareholders (or former shareholders) in publicly traded companies rely on public material misstatements that affect the price of the company's stock. 23 The S.C. decision is paradoxical when stating deceptive acts were not communicated to the investing public during the relevant times and so the petitioner, as a result, cannot show reliance upon any of the respondent's actions except in an indirect chain that is too remote for liability. The argument adopts a logical-formalistic view that sounds like a contradictio in adiecto. How should fraudulent schemes, whose fulfillment is based upon secrecy, be communicated to the public without contradicting its intrinsic reason? . This theory doesn't find any correspondence in other countries of the "western legal tradition" (U.K., Germany, Canada, Italy etc.). Securities laws generally provide for liability in the context of misrepresentations made in other "secondary market" materials, such as annual or quarterly fillings and certain press releases. 
The European "market abuse" provisions, which focus on insider trading and market manipulation in relation to listed securities, might be applicable to secondary actors 27 . For example, Subsection 118 (8) of the English FSMA provides that "market abuse" is behavior that: a) is likely to give a regular user of the market a false or misleading impression of the supply of, or demand for a price or value of, qualifying investments; or b) would be, or would be likely to be, regarded by a regular user of the market as behavior that would distort, or would be likely to distort, the market in such an investment…". However, Section 118 of FSMA does not expressly create a statutory tort and a private right of action to recover compensation for its breach, rather, S. 383 of the FSMA grants the Financial Services However the overwhelming majority of corporations subject to Canadian securities law are subject to Ontario's Securities Act 31 . Like the primary market regime, the secondary market regime is limited to certain actors: the issuer; in the case of a misrepresentation in an oral statement, the person who made the statement; every director of the issuer; every officer of the issuer, if they "authorized, permitted or acquiesced" to the misrepresentation or failure to disclose; every influential person who knowingly influenced the misrepresentation or failure to disclose, where an influential person is, essentially, a person with control over the issuer, an insider or, if the issuer is a mutual fund, a fund manager; and experts (accountants, auditors, lawyers and the such) where the misrepresentation made is included in their report, that report is included or summarized in a document containing 28 misrepresentations, and the expert consented, in writing, to the use of the report 32 . The German Securities Trading Act (the "Wertpapierhandelsgesetz" as "WpHG") contains the principal statutory provisions governing capital markets activity in Germany. 33 Similar to their counterparts in the UK and Canada, these provisions limit liability for misstatements to the issuer and, potentially, certain directors and officers of the issuer. WpHG, Section 37(b), (c) does not provide for claims against silent third-parties to commercial transactions that the issuer misreports. Its goal, like most other countries' legislations, is to improve full disclosure. The abovementioned statutes reached a U.S. "fraud-on-the market" model to facilitate the proof of causal link between misrepresentations and economic losses 34 . For example, Section 90A(5) of U.K. Financial Services Markets Act replaces 'intended reliance', as a common law prerequisite, with a requirement that the recipient's reliance should be reasonable in the circumstances. This change facilitates the bringing of fraud actions 35 .
Coexistence between liability for financial misstatements and liability of "non-speaking actors"
32 Ibidem. 33 Id., at 21. 34 "Further, the existing statutory regime makes fraud claims easier to bring than at present at common law, because the claimant need only show that his own reliance on the misstatement was reasonable and not also that the issuer intended that he should rely on it." see DAVIES, at 4; E. GOTTSCHALK Although liability is not imposed by statute or regulation on third parties that enter into transactions with the issuer which the issuer then misreports, a joint and several liability might be applied when fraud and dishonesty are involved in a tortious conduct Tort of deceit needs the proof of reliance that involves normally a preexisting relationship between victim and tortfeasor. How long this conduct must correspond directly to a misstatement is strongly disputed. As Prof. Davies noticed "the tort of deceit is a form of wrongdoing developed by the common law specifically to deal with misstatements." (emphasis added) 43 . The speaking-actor must either know that the statement is false or not care whether it is true or false; and a genuine belief in the truth of the statement would be a defence to liability. is stated: "an agreement to cheat the public by leading them to believe the shares had a value, which the plaintiffs and defendants knew they had not, and thus inducing them to become purchasers. Is such a transaction illegal? I am of opinion that it is, and might be made the subject of an indictment for conspiracy." 47 In this Opinion it was irrelevant that the deception had been carried out by deeds, rather than words: "I can see no substantial distinction between false rumours and false and fictitious acts; the price of the shares in this case was artificial, and the premium unreal and nominal, to the knowledge of all parties concerned, put forward to induce the public to take shares, with which otherwise they would have had nothing to do." . The Norris opinion outlined that advancing one's own commercial interests by false and fictitious acts is not sufficient to be held liable for fraud. It needs the aggravating features of the malicious or wrongful objective of injuring the plaintiff. Far from any exclusion of any non-speaking actors liability, the problem is the positive allegation of such requirements. The German BGB supplies a joint and several liability for tortfeasor collaboration, assistance and encouragement in his Mittäterhaftung ( § 830 BGB). Section 830, par. 2 constitutes a general basis for joint and several liability in tort. According to the German tort system, recovery for pure economic losses requires a subjective right infringement ( § 823 BGB) or an intentional harm contra bonos mores, as a conscious violation of normal business practices ( § 826 BGB sittenwidrigen Schädigung) require the evidence of his exact knowledge of potential damages or victims but a general awareness of the unlawful goal shared by the parties involved in the scheme is sufficient. Although the correctness of both solutions ( § 823 or § 826 BGB) is discussed, the last one seems more appropriate than the first; as the majority of commentators observed, German Securities Trading Act ("WpHG") improved full disclosure as a public interest, not as a "subjective right" to financial transparency. In the application of § 826 BGB German courts are strongly influenced by criminal law doctrines 51 . As a result, since the third party in Stoneridge consciously promoted unlawful activities or participated in scheme implementation, its behavior could be considered substantially equivalent to issuer misrepresentation 52 . States Supreme Court held that top government officials were not liable for the actions of their subordinates absent evidence that they ordered the allegedly discriminatory activity. civil action any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person (aids and abets) in violation of such Act. The measure would overturn Stoneridge and embrace a private cause of action against those who knowingly aid and abet a fraud -whether law firms, accountants, or investment advisors. At a hearing September 17, 2009 held by the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on crime and drugs Columbia, Professor John Coffee, Jr. supported the measure albeit urging caps on damages for secondary tortfeasors. In fact, the fairness and justice of a legal rule must be questioned when its effect is to place full liability on a defendant who may have been only marginally at fault, and to provide full compensation to a plaintiff who is able to find one on whom to fix the blame for the loss. 55 Giving the plaintiffs' bar aiding-and-abetting authority would offer class action lawyers one more weapon with which to shake down settlements 56 . "Today's hearing focuses on yet another case where the Supreme Court has misinterpreted the clear intent of Congress. This important hearing will examine laws designed to deter and punish those who assist and participate in fraud schemes. In the wake of scandals like Enron, the Madoff case, and the widespread financial fraud that contributed to our current economic crisis, we need to start holding those who take part in fraud accountable. I have long supported efforts to ensure that we give our Federal agencies the tools they need to help address fraud. The Supreme Court has made this issue more difficult to address in the wake of their divided decision in Stoneridge v. For this reason defendants might be afforded some protection by proportionate liability, 15 U.S.C. but the effect of that provision is reduced substantially by the exceptions for intentional fraud and the insolvency of other defendants 58 .
Aiders and abettors liability: a new matter for Congress

Myths of transparency: against a formalistic approach
As fictitious acts and transactions were traditionally used to create a false appearance of insolvence to defraud creditors, the same goal is achieved in modern securities markets by creating a false appearance of prosperity through schemes and manipulations to defraud shareholders. 59 The securities trading laws' fundamental purpose is to promote full disclosure. This aim is pursued principally through a special statutory liability regime that charges certain actors with mandatory disclosure, without precluding tort remedies 60 . When transparency purpose can easily be circumvented through polymorphous machinations, excluding other legal means could turn into a lack of protection for disgruntled investors. Furthermore, this statutory interpretation might sound like a misunderstood (somehow mythicized) financial transparency 61 . Is it possible that investors rely on something unknown? The answer might be positive, since a scheme to defraud shareholders must not come into light, but needs to be kept secret. Otherwise it would be a nonsense. However, leaving investors to their rights in the tort of deceit is a ineffective solution; indeed bringing successfully an action against non-speaking-actors and demonstrating their liability seems extremely difficult.
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A better solution is represented by a statutory tort provision that introduces liability (maybe capped or proportional) for aiders and abettors. Its success depends widely on the introduction of strong 60 Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge, 2005, 182: "We have seen that people use heuristics that lead them to make systematic blunders, and they make different choices depending on the framing of the problem." 62 "Moreover in the European Union the Member States can still impose a private cause of action against aidors and abettors for the violation of the respective provisions of the applicable directives in their national law…Due to the limited approach of the applicable directives both problems cannot be solved under the current European capital market law regime." HILLGARD, MOCK, at 569. inference of scienter (or recklessness) requirement, fraud-on-the market doctrine and class action suit 63 . 63 See HILGARD, MOCK, at 569 ff.: "Core features of the U.S. system such as class actions, punitive damages and discovery are not known in Europe"; on deterrence function, see also PRITCHARD, at 6: "A better damages rule would focus on deterrence rather than compensation. Instead of making defendants liable for all losses resulting from misstatements, we should instead force defendants to disgorge their gains (or expected gains, for those who fail in their scheme) from the fraud."
